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ANTITRUST LAW 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES THE NOERR-
PENNINGTON DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bu-
reau, Inc./ the Ninth Circuit limited the extent to which efforts 
to influence the findings of administrative agencies are immune 
from the antitrust laws under the Noerr-Pennington2 doctrine 
and its concomitant sham exception.3 
The plaintiff was a freight forwarder,· subject to regulation 
under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) and regulated by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The defendants were 
trucking companies regulated by the ICC and the Rocky Moun-
tain Motor Tari~ Bureau (RMMTB), a rate bureau formed 
under the ICA.II 
ICC rate regulations8 provide that a freight forwarder seek-
ing a rate change publish the amended schedule. In the absence 
of protest, the rate will automatically take effect. Plaintiff, seek-
ing a lower rate, published the desired rate change.7 RMMTB 
1. 674 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Wallace, J. and von der Heydt, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 
103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983). 
2. The term Noerr-Pennington comes from two Supreme Court cases. See United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), Eastern RR. Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
3. See generally, Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government 
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 
(1977). 
4. A freight forwarder assembles and consolidates small shipments into single lots 
for carrier companies to then ship. 674 F.2d at 1257. 
5. A rate bureau is an organization formed by carriers to set rates and fares for 
members within an ICC-approved agreement. RMMTS's membership services 80 per-
cent of the transcontinental surface transportation market. Id. 
6. ICC rate regulation of freight forwarders such as Clipper is provided· in 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1005 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10725, 10762 (1976». 
7. In 1970, plaintiff published a lowered rate of $1056, but hoped eventually to lower 
29 
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protested the lower rate to the ICC.8 Thereafter, plaintiff filed 
several amendments to the new rate, progressively lowering it.s 
RMMTB protested each amendment. During this administrative 
process,10 the ICC consistently ruled for the plaintiff, and the 
defendants exhausted all ICC procedures to prevent implemen-
tation of the lower rate. 11 
In 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint in district court against 
RMMTB and various trucking companies,12 alleging antitrust vi-
olations.13 Plaintiff contended (1) defendants' protests of the 
rate were sham protests filed for the purpose of directly interfer-
ing with competitive activity; (2) in protesting to the ICC, defen-
dants furnished false information.14 
The district court, in granting defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment/II held that defendants' protests were immune as 
a matter of law under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In revers-
ing, the Court of Appeals held that (1) factual issues existed 
concerning whether defendants' activities came within the sham 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine;16 (2) a single suit 
or protest is sufficient to invoke the sham exception;17 (3) in or-
der to invoke the sham exception, plaintiff is not required to 
prove that access to a governmental body is foreclosed;18 (4) fur-
nishing false information to an administrative agency in connec-
its rate to $842. Plaintiff expected defendants to protest to the ICC any lowered rate it 
published. Plaintiff felt RMMTB had always tried to maintain the rates of freight for-
warders and carriers to an equal level and would take action to maintain that parity. 674 
F.2d at 1257. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. If there is a protest, the ICC can suspend effectiveness of the rate while it inves-
tigates the protest. The ICC did not suspend the $1,056 rate, but did investigate the rate 
over the next two years. [d. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. at 1257-58. 
13. Plaintiff claimed damages for: (1) the loss incurred in delaying institution of its 
final rate; (2) the costs of responding to the protests; and (3) business loss because of the 
uncertainty surrounding plaintiff's rates. Plaintiff claimed that shippers will not use a 
rate if it is under ICC investigation. [d. at 1258. 
14. [d. at 1257-58. Clipper also contended that the protests were part of a larger 
antitrust violation. [d. 
15. The district court denied the defendants' two previous motions for summary 
judgment. [d. 
16. [d. at 1264. 
17. [d. at 1267. 
18. [d. at 1269. 
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tion with an adjudicatory proceeding can be the basis for anti-
trust liability if accompanied by predatory intent and other 
elements of an antitrust claim. Ie This note will explore the basis 
for the coures decision and discuss its significance in terms of 
clarifying an important area of antitrust law. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
The proliferation of government regulation in industry and 
business has forced the courts to consider whether attempts to 
gain competitive advantages through the exercise of the right to 
petition are in some cases a misuse of government processes in 
violation of the Sherman Act.20 
Under the judicially created Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
bona fide efforts to obtain or influence legislative, executive, ju-
dicial or administrative actions are immune from antitrust liabil-
ity.21 However, if the purported effort to influence or obtain gov-
ernment action is in reality merely an attempt to interfere with 
the business relationships of a competitor, the activity may not 
enjoy antitrust immunity.22 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception 
were first enunciated in Eastern Railroad Presidents Confer-
ence u. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 2s In Noerr, the Supreme 
19. Id. at 1271. 
20. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ...... 15 U.S.C. § 
1 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes all attempts and conspiracies to mo-
nopolize. "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . ahall be deemed guilty 
...... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See infra notes 24-55 & accompanying text. 
21. See generally 7 von Kalinowski, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION, 
§ 46.04 (1980). 
22. 365 U.S. at 144. 
23. Id. Noerr involved a battle between the railroad industry and the trucking in-
dustry over long-haul freight business. A group of truck operations sued twenty-four rail-
roads and a public relations firm, claiming the defendants conspired to restrain trade in 
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by concertedly engaging in a massive 
publicity canIpaign designed to promote laws and law enforcement practices destructive 
to the trucking industry. Plaintiff alleged that the sole purpose of the canIpaign was to 
undermine its competitiveness with respect to the railroad. Id. at 129-130. For a detailed 
analysis of the facts in Noerr, see Waldon, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and 
the Right to Petition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1211, 1214-20 (1967). 
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Court held that no violation of the Sherman Act can be predi-
cated on mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement 
of laws, even if the conduct is for an anticompetitive purpose 
and is accomplished by deliberate deception of public officials.2• 
The Court advanced four arguments in support of their rul-
ing.211 First, the Court stated that there was an "essential dissim-
ilarity" between agreements to seek government actions and 
agreements traditionally constituting violations of the antitrust 
laws, such as price-fixing agreements and boycotts.26 Second, to 
subject attempts to influence the passage of legislation to anti-
trust sanctions impaired the functioning of a representative gov-
ernment by reducing the flow of information on which govern-
ment agencies are dependent.27 Third, the court recognized the 
differences between conduct which is political activity, not regu-
lated by the Sherman Act, and business activity, which is the 
focus of the Act.28 Fourth, construing the Sherman Act to in-
clude attempts to influence government would raise constitu-
tional questions, since the right to petition the government IS 
protected by the first amendment. 29 
The Court in Noerr also announced a "sham" exception to 
its newly created antitrust immunity. The Court stated that an-
titrust immunity may not extend to activities ostensibly directed 
toward influencing government action, but which were in reality 
a mere sham to disguise an attempt to interfere with a competi-
tor's business relationships. so 
24. 365 U.S. at 135-36. 
25. See Fishel, supra note 3 at 82-83. 
26. 365 U.S. at 136. 
27. Id. at 137. See Note, Antitrust-Supreme Court Extends Noerr Immunity From 
Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Adjudication, 76 DICK L. REV. 593, 594-95 
(1972), for a more complete discussion of this point. 
28. 365 U.S. at 137. 
29. Id. at 138; the plaintiff in Noerr contended that even if attempts to influence 
government were exempt from antitrust liability, the defendants had forfeited that ex-
emption because, one, their sole purpose was to destroy competition; and two, the pub-
licity campaign involved deliberate deception of the public and public officials. The 
Court held, however, that the right of people to inform their government representatives 
and the legality of conduct directed toward obtaining government action cannot be made 
to depend on an anti-competitive intent or purpose that may advantage one group and 
disadvantage another. The Court further reasoned that even though the publicity cam-
paign was not ethical, it fell within the range of political activity and therefore was not 
subject to regulation by the Sherman Act. Id. at 138-41. 
30. Id. at 144. 
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The antitrust immunity for attempts to influence legislative· 
decisions established in Noerr was reaffirmed and extended to 
include attempts to influence executive action in United Mine 
Workers of America v. Pennington.11 The Court in Pennington 
held that joint efforts to influence public officials, even if in-
tended to eliminate competition, did not violate the antitrust 
laws. III 
Expansion of the Sham Exception 
In California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited," the 
Supreme Court extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to at-
tempts to influence administrative and judicial (adjudicatory) 
bodies.84 The Court held, however, that if the petitioning of ac-
tivities deprived a rival of access to the administrative and judi-
cial process, or if a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims was in-
volved the, sham exception enunciated in Noerr would apply." 
Two recent cases have further expanded the sham excep-
tion.ls In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,8' the Supreme 
Court held that litigation intended to delay and prevent the es-
tablishment of rival competition constituted a sham." In deter-
-
31. 381 U.S. 657. In Pennington, a BJDall mine company brought an action under II 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against the United Mine Workers and certain Iarp c:oal 
companies. Plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in anticompetitive efforts to influ-
ence the Secretary of Labor to obtain a minimum wage requirement for employees of 
contractors selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority, making it difficult for small 
companies to compete in TVA contracts. Id. at 659-60. 
32. Id. at 670. 
33. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
34. In Trucking, the Supreme Court held that a complaint should not be dismissed 
which alleged that defendants, nineteen large California trucking firms, instituted 
groundless proceedings before state agencies and courts to prevent plaintiffs, a group of 
interstate trucking firms, from obtaining necessary administrative approvals. Id. at 509. 
For a more detailed analysis of the facts in Trucking, see, Note, Antitrust: The Braku 
"Fail on the Noerr-Doctrine, 57 CALII'. L. REv. 518, 520-24 (1969). 
35. 404 U.S. at 512; the Court stated that the very fact such suits were baseless 
would be evidence that they were instituted primarily in order to drive a competitor out 
of business rather than to assert a legitimate legal right. Id. The Trucking Court based 
its decision on the first amendment rights to petition. Id. at 512. 
36. See generally, Crawford & Tschoepe, The Erosion 0/ the Noerr Pennington Im-
munity, 13 ST. MARy's L.J. 291, 302-04 (1981). 
37. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
38. Otter Tall, an electric power company serving three states, had franchisee in 
several towns. The towns decided to establish municipal electricity distribution lystelDS 
when Otter Tail's franchiEes expired. One condition of sale for bonds to finance these 
systems was that there be" no pending litigation which might affect the bonds. By insti-
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mining the existence of a sham, the Court considered the multi-
plicity of lawsuits and whether such suits carried the "hallmark 
of insubstantial claims."3s 
Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.,40 dealt with the single 
sham suit issue, but not within the Noerr-Pennington context.41 
During an analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act,42 the court made 
reference to the Trucking language of "a pattern of baseless, re-
petitive claims. "43 This discussion of repetitive suits dealt only 
with whether litigation can be enjoined and not with the re-
quirements for an antitrust violation. However, lower courts" 
have relied on Lektro- Vend as authority for the proposition that 
a single baseless suit can be the basis for an antitrust claim.41i 
Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit considered the sham exception in 
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint 
Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers.48 In Franchise Realty, the 
tuting suits challenging the bonds, Otter Tail prevented the towns from establishing 
their own systems. ld. at 369-72. 
39. ld. at 380. 
40. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). 
41. In Lektro-Vend, the plaintiffs, in response to a state court suit against them for 
breach of non-competition agreements, brought suit in federal court claiming that the 
agreements violated antitrust laws under 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982), and that the purpose of 
the defendant's state-court lawsuit was to harass and eliminate competition. Mter judg-
ment was entered in the state proceeding, the plaintiffs were granted a federal injunction 
against collection. 433 U.S. at 623. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the federal 
district court should not have intervened in the state court proceedings by enjoining 
enforcement of the judgment. The result in Lektro-Vend is the narrow holding that a 
federal judge can enjoin the commencement of additional state court suits, not because 
several suits constitute an antitrust violation while one does not, but rather because the 
anti-injunction statute only prohibits the enjoining of existing state suits. ld. at 636; see 
id. at 637 n.8. 
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). 
43. 433 U.S. at 635 n.6, 636, 639 n.9. 
44. See, e.g., 674 F.2d at 1266 n.24; Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assn. v. South-
land Corp. 467 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979), Cyborg Systems Inc. v. Management Sci-
ence Am., Inc., 78-1 Trade Cas. 11 61,927 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
45. Justice Stevens, writing for four dissenters, concluded that under the anti-in-
junction statute federal courts can enjoin a state court proceeding which is itself an anti-
trust violation. Further, a single abuse of the adjudicatory process could constitute an 
antitrust violation. 433 U.S. at 654-61. 
46. 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). In Franchise, 
the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that two associations of 
restaurant and hotel employers and a labor union had combined and conspired to re-
peatedly, baselessly, and in bad faith, oppose the granti.ng of building permits by the 
6
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defendants opposed applications for building permits. The ad-
ministrative agency which acted on permits was found by the 
court to be "as much a political as an adjudicatory body.""? The 
court stated that the sham exception does not apply to direct 
lobbying efforts, but only to situations where defendants are not 
seeking official action by a governmental body."a Furthermore, a 
complaint must include allegations of specific activities which 
barred access to a governmental body."9 Re<:ently, in Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc. v. Codding,r.o involving threats of multiple lawsuits, 
the Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts at issue from those in 
Franchise Realty.r.1 The court held that a claim for relief is pos-
sible under the sham exception when the threat of litigation is 
used to retain a monopoly and thereby bar a competitor from 
the market.r.2 
Other Circuits 
The other circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether a 
single sham suit can constitute an antitrust violation. Some 
courts maintain that repetitive, baseless suits must be shown to 
establish a violation. r.a Another line of precedent concludes that 
a single sham suit is sufficient. U 
local Board of Permit Appeals to a competitor. [d. at 1078. 
47. [d. at 1079. 
48. [d. at 1080-81. 
49. [d. at 1082. 
SO. 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980). In Codding, a real estate developer alleged that a 
rival developer filed or underwrote thirteen overlapping, repetitive and baseless lawsuits 
for purposes of maintaining a monopoly and elinlinating the plaintiff as a competitor. [d. 
at 833-34. 
51. See supra notes 46-49 & accompanying text. 
52. 615 F.2d at 840-42. 
53. See, e.g., Taylor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 560 F.2d 211, 
213 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (a single successful lawsuit is not a sham); First Nat'l 
Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. 514,'520-21 (D. Minn. 1979) 
(single lawsuit with no unethical conduct accompanying its institution, insufficient to fall 
within mere sham exception) aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 4SO U.S. 
1042 (1981); Mountain Grove Cemetery Assn. v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951, 
955-56 (D. Conn. 1977) (to permit institution of sham clainls on the basis of one suit 
would be an undue deterrent to legitimate petition of courts); Central Bank of Clayton v. 
Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (single intervention in administra-
tive and judicial proceedings not a sham) aff'd. 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
433 U.S. 910 (1977). 
54. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 
(5th Cir. 1978) (a showing of a pattern of repetitive, baseless, claims is strong evidence of 
a sham petitioning, but s'lch evidence is not essential to proof of sham) cert. denied, 
Palmer v. Feminist Women's Health Center, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cad-
7
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A second area of disagreement among the circuits is whether 
. access to the agencies and courts must be foreclosed in order to 
state a valid antitrust claim under the sham exception. A major-
ity of the circuits hold that the essential element of a valid sham 
exception claim is the allegation of an absence of a genuine ef-
fort to influence government with the intent to injure a competi-
tor directly, rather than an allegation that access was barred.1iIi 
A minority of circuits focus on whether plaintiffs were de-
nied free and unlimited access to the tribunals.68 These courts 
have held that in order to constitute violation, sham litigation 
involving an administrative agency must bar potential competi-
tors from access to the decision making process.67 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION 
In remanding to the district court, the Ninth Circuit found 
as a factual question the issue of whether conduct was a genuine 
effort to influence government action, thereby entitled to immu-
nity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, or a mere sh~m.68 
Since the defendants admitted arguendo that their protests wer-
e filed automatically and without regard to their merit, the pro-
tests were baseless for purposes of a summary judgment motion. 
The fact that defendants lost all protests further underscored 
that the protests were baseless, thereby establishing a sufficient 
showing to present a triable issue of fact. 59 Thus, for purposes of 
illac Gage Co., 507 F. Supp. 939, 946 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (no per se requirement that more 
than one claim underlie cause of action based upon "sham" litigation, nor must plaintiff 
allege denial of access); Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packag-
ing Inc., 480 F. Supp. 124, 127-28 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (one lawsuit brought to prevent al-
leged trade secrets violations can constitute antitrust violation when brought in bad faith 
or without probable cause); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 
F. Supp. 373, 378 (D. Colo. 1979) (Supreme Court did not intend to give "every dog one 
free bite, thus making it an irrebuttable presumption that the first law suit was not a 
sham regardless of overwhelming evidence indicating otherwise."). 
55. E.g., Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288, 295 (8th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Tex. 1978). 
56. E.g., Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norfolk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951 (D. 
Conn. 1977); Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mi., 
1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Bethlehem 
Plaza v. Campbell, 493 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
57. As one court has stated, "(a]ccess-barring is the cornerstone of the sham excep-
tion." Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1134-35 (N.D. N.Y. 
1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). 
58. 674 F.2d at 1264. 
59. Id. at 1267. 
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summary judgment, plaintiffs showed sufficiently that the defen-
dants' protests were baseless and prosecuted without regard to 
their merit, intended rather to delay competitive conduct and 
not to influence governmental action.80 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a single suit or single pro-
test was sufficient to invoke the sham exception.81 The court 
based its conclusion on the first amendment theory governing 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Not all activity that appears as 
an effort to influence the government is actually an exercise of 
the first amendment right to petition. It simply may be an effort 
to interfere directly with a competitor. In that case, the "sham" 
petitioning is not entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine, regardless of whether it is a single suit or mul-
tiple suits.82 
The court next stated that, despite the holdings of Otter 
Tail88 and Trucking," harassment of a rival through an adminis-
trative proceeding may have the same effect as harassment 
through the judicial system.8S The court saw no reason to distin-
guish cases on the basis of the specific petitioning activity 
involved.88 
The court further found that its decision was not inconsis-
tent with Franchise Realty, where the Ninth Circuit held that 
access barring was a necessary element of a sham claim.87 The 
court noted that the recent Ninth Circuit decision· of Codding 
found a cause of action under the sham exception despite the 
absence of access barring and the decision in Franchise Realty.88 
The defendants contended that if proof of access barring 
60. Id. at 1264. On remand plaintiffs will need to establish facts to invoke the sham 
exception. Id. Defendants' contended that to fall within the sham exception, Trucking 
required that the alleged misconduct (1) consist of a pattern of repetitive claims; (2) be 
baseless; and (3) bar access to the governmental body. Id. at 1265. 
61. Id. at 1267. 
62. Id. at 1266. 
63. In Otter Tail, the litigation used to suppress competition actually gave the 
plaintiffs greater access to the courts. Id. 
64. Id. at 1268. 
65.Id. 
66.Id. 
67. 674 F.2d at 1268. 
68. 615 F.2d at 841 n.4. 
9
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was not required, every competitor who was adversely effected 
by the filing of a protest would bring an antitrust action against 
the protesting party. Such increased litigation would deter the 
exercise of first amendment rights.8s In response to this conten-
tion, the court stated that a plaintiff must prove the usual ele-
ments of an antitrust violation in addition to showing that a de-
fendant's petitioning activity was an attempt to interfere with 
the business relationships of a competitor.70 The court found 
this burden of proof sufficient to protect the exercise of first 
amendment rights. Accordingly, invoking the sham exception re-
quires an allegation of some abuse of process, but not necessarily 
access barring. 71 
In adopting a new rule for the Ninth Circuit, the court 
stated that if the requisite predatory intent is present and the 
other elements of an antitrust claim are proven, fraudulently 
furnishing false information to an agency conducting an adjudi-
catory proceeding can be the basis for antitrust liability.72 
The court pointed out that the adjudicatory sphere in Clip-
per was different from the political sphere involved in Noerr and 
Pennington. In the political sphere the falsity of statements can 
be detected more readily, whereas in the adjudicatory sphere in-
formation supplied by the parties is necessarily relied upon for 
decision making. If the information furnished is fraudulent, the 
functioning of these agencies is thwarted. Therefore, immunity 
from either antitrust laws or first amendment protection can 
never be granted to a party who with predatory intent furnishes 
69. 674 F.2d at 1269. 
70. Id. This necessarily includes showing there was also not a genuine effort to influ-
ence government action. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1271. This holding extends the Walker Process doctrine to cases not aris-
ing in the patent context. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 
382 U.S. 172 (1965), posed the question of whether maintenance and enforcement of a 
patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, and therefore subject to a treble damage claim by an injured party 
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court held that "the enforcement of a patent 
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 . . . provided the other 
elements necessary to a § 2 case are present." Id. at 174. The fact that Walker Process 
provides a rule of general applicability was intimated by the statement in Trucking con-
cerning misrepresentations which are condoned in the political arena, but which are not 
condoned when used in the judicial process. 404 U.S. at 513. 
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false information to an adjudicatory body.73 
D. ANALYSIS 
The central problem surrounding claims based on the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception rule has 
been the definition of evidentiary requirements necessary to 
state a cause of action. In Clipper, the Ninth Circuit finally pro-
vides clear guidelines for interpreting the doctrine and clarifies 
the basis for and limitations of three key criteria in stating a 
cause of action.7• 
Pattern of Repetitive Claims 
Under Clipper, the first amendment is deemed the basis for 
immunity from antitrust laws,n that is, the conduct being scru-
tinized must be evaluated by applying first amendment criteria. 
The first amendment does not protect intentional falsehoods.7• 
By analogy, litigation or protests that a competitor knows to be 
without legitimate foundation are unprotected.77 Therefore, re-
gardless of whether a single claim or a pattern of claims is in-
volved, fraudulent activity should not be protected. As the court 
in Clipper correctly reasons, under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine, a single claim can invoke the sham exception.78 
The "pattern of baseless repetitive claims"79 language of 
Trucking is treated by some circuits as requiring that there be a 
73. 674 F.2d at 1271. The court applies the statement of the Supreme Court, "there 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
74. As two commentators state, "IDJuring the twenty years since Noerr was decided, 
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have struggled to ... establish the true 
scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine." Crawford & Tschoepe, supra note 36, at 292. 
75. 674 F.2d at 1265. 
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
77. See Balmer, Sham Litigation And The Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 39, 
61 (1980). 
78. [d. at 71 n.7. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 203b (1978): 
[d. at 71 n.7. 
It is true, of course, that a repetitious pattern of clearly 
unmeritorious litigation makes proof of bad faith and abuse of 
the judicial processes much easier. There is however, nothing 
inherently illogical in the possibility that a single lawsuit may 
be filed with the purpose of directly interfering with another's 
business so that the antitrust laws would be violated as a 
result. 
79. 404 U.S. at 513. 
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cause of action for antitrust liability.80 This reflects a narrow in-
terpretation of Trucking. A better analysis would be to view the 
"pattern" requirement as an illustration of an antitrust violation 
and not as a minimum standard.81 Although repetitious lawsuits 
are an indication that activity is a sham, they are not a prerequi-
site for the imposition of liability. The prosecution of a single 
sham suit can be a significant restraint of trade in furtherance of 
monopolization, and therefore should be punished under the 
Sherman Act. 
Access Denial 
It remains unclear whether the harm caused by baseless liti-
gation can constitute an antitrust violation even though access 
to the agencies and the courts is not actually restricted.82 The 
confusion stems from the language of Trucking, where the Court 
not only spoke of "a purpose to deprive competitors of meaning-
ful access to the agencies and the courts," but also noted that 
the judicial process had been abused.83 Although a minority of 
circuit courts have drawn the implication that any abuse of judi-
cial. process is tantamount to barring effective access to the 
courts,84 such a broad reading is unwarranted. 
In Trucking, the concepts of access barring and abuse of the 
judicial process were treated as synonymous. There, the defen-
dants intervened in every proceeding, and as a result both 
abused the agency processes and effectively foreclosed plaintiffs 
from access to the agency.8t1 In Otter Tail, however, the abuse of 
process was a result of the maintenance of prolonged litigation." 
The defendant's primary goal was to delay or halt competition 
rather than to discourage the use of the judicial process.87 By 
focusing on the repetitive and insubstantial nature of the claims, 
Otter Tail indicates that access barring refers only to one type 
of abuse which may constitute an antitrust violation. Therefore, 
SO. See supra note 54 for cases where a pattern of baseless claims was held to be a 
prerequisite for antitrust liability. 
81. See Lektro-Vend, 433 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
82. See Balmer, supra note 77, at 42. 
83. 404 U.S. at 512. 
84. See supra note 56 for cases which find access barring conduct by the defendants. 
85. 404 U.S. at 511. 
86. 410 U.S. at 380. 
87. See, R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX at 355 (1978). 
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the interpretation of Trucking by some courts that it requires 
access barring is too narrow. A better interpretation of Otter 
Tail and Trucking is that in Trucking, the defendant's conduct 
constituted a sham primarily because there was no genuine ef-
. fort to influence governmental action and also because access to 
governmental action was denied.88 
The Ninth Circuit in Clipper properly applies first amend-
ment principles as a basis for analyzing access denial in the con-
text of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Baseless litigation 
through abuse of process can force a competitor out of business 
or prevent expansion even though the litigation does not literally 
bar the competitor from access to the courts. Such action consti-
tutes an antitrust violation despite the fact that the competitor's 
redress to violation of its first amendment rights was not fore-
closed.89 Hence, the court correctly views baseless litigation in 
the administrative agency context as an abuse which is not re-
quired to rise to the level of access barring to constitute an anti-
trust violation. Filing a suit without merit which intentionally 
harms a competitor is in itself a violation that is undeserving of 
protection. 
Fraud 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the rights of the 
business community to employ governmental processes for the 
resolution of legal, economic and social problems. If, however, in 
asserting these rights for private gain' the governmental 
processes are abused, the issue arises as to whether the conduct 
involved is immune.9o 
Trucking suggests that when considering misrepresentations 
made to governmental bodies, a distinction should be drawn be-
tween those bodies whose functions are essentially legislative or 
political, and those whose functions are essentially adjudica-
tive.91 In Noerr, the court stressed that deceptive statements 
made to legislators in an attempt to influence legislation are po-
88. See generally, Fischel, supra note 3, at 105-10, for a general discussion of the 
sham exception. 
89. See BORK, supra note 87, at 347-49. 
90. See id. at 355-56. 
91. "Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when 
used in the adjudicatory process." 404 U.S. at 513. 
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litical activity traditionally accorded wide latitude by the 
courts.92 Therefore, absent proof that the defendants lacked the 
intention to influence governmental action, attempts to influ-
ence the legislative or executive branches in connection with the 
formation of governmental policy are not condemned as a sham. 
In contrast, furnishing fraudulent information in the adjudica-
tive setting is not protected under the guise of political expres-
sion. Such activity, seen both as evidence of bad faith and as an 
attempt to impede governmental operations, subjects the initiat-
ing party to antitrust attack. 
. ·Regulatory agencies, such as the ICC, conduct quasi-judicial 
administrative proceedings. The same degree of protection af-
forded judicial proceedings should be extended to regulatory 
agencies, as both often depend on highly technical factual data 
supplied by the regulated industry. Regulatory agencies neces-
sarily rely on the honesty of the parties before them as they lack 
the time and resources to conduct investigations and scrutinize 
information provided to them.93 Accordingly, even though the 
tactics used to influence the legislative or executive branches do 
not affect antitrust immunity, the penalty for knowingly provid-
ing false information to a court or to an adjudicating regulatory 
agency is loss of the Noerr-Pennington exemption. 
Yet, it is necessary to protect some false statements and 
baseless claims in order to avoid a "chilling effect" on the right 
to petition.9• Statements made which invoke the sham exception 
are analogous to speech that is unprotected by the first amend-
ment. This constitutional analysis, properly adopted by Clipper, 
signifies that the first amendment protects litigation from anti-
trust liability to the same extent that it protects speech from 
government restriction. Litigation that a plaintiff knows to be 
based on fraudulent information, like known falsehoods in the 
free speech area, is unprotected. 
Building on the analogy to the first amendment cases, deci-
92. 365 U.S. at 140-4l. 
93. In an amicus brief submitted in Clipper, the ICC urged the court to find that 
deliberate misrepresentations of material facts to the ICC will make out an antitrust 
claim. Amicus Curiae Brief at p.ll. Clipper. 
94. See Hibner, Litigation As An Overt Act - Development And Prognosis. 46 
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 718. 720 (1978). 
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sions dealing with free speech require a showing that the 
speaker knowingly lied or recklessly disregarded the truth or fal-
sity of his statement.911 This is a high standard. Therefore, to 
protect first amendment values, the standard for challenging 
sham suits as antitrust violations should be comparable to the 
standards applied in first amendment decisions. The party 
claiming that Noerr-Pennington immunity is not applicable 
must prove that defendants knew the falsity of their statements 
and made those statements deliberately to mislead a regulatory 
body.98 
E. CONCLUSION 
Previously, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been applied 
inconsistently by the courts. The Ninth Circuit in Clipper was 
presented with an opportunity to articulate the principles gov-
erning the scope of antitrust immunity granted to those who at-
tempted to influence administrative agencies. From the court's 
analysis it is clear that the central inquiry regarding the conduct 
of defendants asserting the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is 
whether their actions merit first amendment protection.97 It fol-
lows that the sham exception should encompass only activity 
without constitutional protection. 
Our highly technological society has made government more 
dependent upon private industry for information. With this de-
pendency comes a greater duty for industry to be fair and open 
in dealings with government. The antitrust laws can serve an es-
sential role in insuring the integrity of this relationship98 by pro-
viding clear guidance for permissible competitive behavior in 
business-governmental interaction. The Ninth Circuit has taken 
a significant step toward this goal by clarifying an important 
area of antitrust law. 
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95. 376 u.S. 254; 41S U.S. at 347-50. 
96. See Balmer, supra note 77, at 56-61. See generally, J.G. VAN CISE & W.T. LIP-' 
LAND, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1980). 
97. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 122. 
9S. See Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 
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